This paper considers the regulation of pricing of liquid petroleum gas in Mexico. We construct a model which incorporates all information essential to the pricing question, and derive relationships which should hold between prices in Mexico and prices in world markets. Prices in Mexico can be tied to the readily observable prices in the United States by a netback rule. However, this rule can lead to incentives to increase the price of domestic liquid petroleum gas by diverting production from the regulated market.
Introduction
The economics of oil and gas in Mexico are difficult and many of the issues involved are very subtle. It is not surprising that there is substantial misunderstanding of many of the issues involved. The difficulties arise from three sources. First, the national oil company Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) is a monopoly and many of the markets involved are regulated. Prices are not a good guide for economic decisions as to production.
PEMEX must solve a very difficult programming problem to reach decisions as to quantities produced. Second, oil, gas and natural gas liquids are often produced jointly and in such cases it impossible to allocate costs of production to a specific product. 1 Finally, the goods produced are almost perfect substitutes as inputs in production. Gas and oil are substitutes in the generation of power; natural gas liquids, gas and oil are substitutes as feedstocks. There is little or no curvature in the marginal rates of technical substitution. There are very difficult problems in regulating prices. The Comisión Reguladora de Energía (Energy Regulatory Commission) has been given the responsibility of regulating the price of liquid petroleum gas (LPG), natural gas and electricity. This paper considers the means by which the price of LPG in Mexico can be tied to observable world market prices in economically defensible fashion. We begin by considering the essentials of the market for LPGs in North America and the Gulf of Mexico and demonstrate that it is appropriate to tie prices in Mexico to the readily observable LPG prices at Mont Belvieu, Texas. We then demonstrate the detailed linear programming models currently used for the planning of the import, export and distribution of LPG in Mexico can be greatly reduced in dimensionality without loss of information about optimal pricing. This permits the construction of simple transparent policy models which incorporate all information essential to the pricing question. and derive relationships which should hold between prices in Mexico and prices in world markets.
The North American Liquid Petroleum Gas Market

Figure 1
The US is a net importer of LPGs, with net imports running about 100 thousand barrels per day. The majority of this material comes from Canada via pipeline, but significant volumes are imported as waterborne cargoes from Algeria and Venezuela. Depending on market conditions in various parts of the world, the US also imports LPG from Europe (North Sea) and the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, UAE). In the future, as new gas processing facilities come onstream, Nigerian LPG can be expected to flow into the US. Of particular interest to Mexico, is the fact that an annual average of 35 million barrels a day (MBD) of LPGs are imported into U. S. Gulf Coast (USCG) region from outside North America.
About 70 percent of this material comes from Algeria, the remainder from Venezuela.
These imports are landed at Houston, where they can move into storage facilities at Mont Belvieu.
Mont Belvieu is located 20 miles northeast of Houston and has long been the center of the US market for natural gas liquids (NGL). There are four large fractionators that produce 23 million gallons per day of finished product in Mont Belvieu. Mont Belvieu has the largest NGL storage facilities in the world. Located in underground salt domes, the total storage capacity exceeds 4,000 million gallons. The market is large so the price at Mont Belvieu is used for trading in Texas, Louisiana and throughout the Caribbean basin.
LPG, butane and propane, are a subset of NGL which include ethane, isobutane, and natural gasoline.
LPG from South America and North Africa is also traded at Mont Belvieu. One of the reasons that LPG trades in an international market is that NGL becomes liquid at temperature of about 0 degrees F. By contrast, natural gas becomes liquid at about -275 degrees F. Thus, it is relatively cheap to liquefy and transport LPG. It costs about $5.00 to It should be noted that there is considerable seasonal variation in these imports. In winter, LPG prices in Europe typically rise sufficiently to attract all of the waterborne LPG available from Africa and South America. Under these conditions, it becomes uneconomic to ship this material to the USGC, and imports cease. In summer, however, European prices drop, imports into the US become attractive, and some 50-60 MBD moves into the USGC.
When the US is importing LPG into the USGC, prices at Mont Belvieu should equate to the landed cost of imports (including terminal costs) 3 . Noting further that the sailing distance from Algeria to Pajaritos (c. 5500 n.m.) differs only slightly from that from Algeria to Houston (c. 5400 n.m.), the landed cost of imports into Pajaritos should be approximately the same as the landed cost in Houston, differing only by the amount of the 2. See M. D. Tusiani (1997) .
3. Butane imported to the U.S.is used as a feedstock in petro-chemicals and must be fractionated into normal and iso-butane before entering the market. This should be treated as an addition to terminal costs for butane imported into the U.S. LPG in mexico is used as a source of heat and fractionation is not necessary at Pajaritos In the winter of 1996-97, low propane stocks, high crop-drying demand in the fall, and cold weather combined to create a shortage of propane in markets served by Conway, which could not be reached by product from Mont Belvieu due to pipeline limitations.
Consequently, Conway prices reached levels significantly higher than those in Mont Belvieu. However, this is a highly unusual situation, and under normal circumstances, one finds the price of propane at Conway to be essentially the same as Mont Belvieu, i.e Mont Belvieu even.
Natural gas liquids are extracted at gas processing plants in New Mexico and West
Texas. However, there is insufficient capacity in the region to fractionate all these liquids into marketable products including propane and butane. Thus, to meet product demand in the area LPGs must flow back to the region from fractionation plants elsewhere, e.g. Con-
way. Consequently, one should expect the price of LPG at the Mexican border to be equal to Conway (or equivalently, Mont Belvieu) plus transportation costs of approximately 3 cent per gallon.
A Model for Pricing Liquid Petroleum Gas
PEMEX uses a very large programing model to plan production and to price LPG in Mexico. 5 This model is very general and very detailed. The duals of the model are the values of the product and the cost of meeting the demands. However, the model is too detailed to be very transparent as to the relationship between the variables. The key variables of interested are the duals associated with the stocks. Large linear models are very easy to compute, but results can be less than transparent. Fortunately, the maximum theorem permits us to show that large programming models can be reduced to a models whose dimensionality is that of the input and constraint set. (See Appendix) This model can be solved analytically and permit a clear understanding as to the implications of various policy choices on the price of gas.
Any path through a network that connects a source of gas to a point of demand is a
Hotelling line. This basic concept permits the construction of models for studying the implications of pricing policy for LPG. The price can be derived from the concept of Ricardian rents. As long as gas is free to flow the price of gas must equal the price at the source plus the cost of gas of moving gas to the point of demand. Any other price creates the possibility of profits from arbitrage.
Consider the stylized pipeline in Figure 3 below 5. See Comisión Reguladora de Energía (1997)
Figure 3
Assume that the pipeline is a circle normalized to a circumference of 3. The cost of transporting gas is c per unit of length and there is unit demand on the circle uniformly distributed. There are three equally spaced nodes on the pipeline. Node 1 is a connection to a source . Node 2 is located 1 unit from Node 1 and is a connection to a competitive market supply at a price . Node 3 is located 1 unit from Node 1 and is a connection to a competitive market demand at a price . If flow through the pipeline is not constrained, then market equilibrium requires that . The price at Node 1 is . The price at the arbitrage point, , midway between Node 1 and Node 2, is .
We can map this circle into a line to get the price gradient.
Figure 4
The point at Node 3 in the circle is mapped into the end points of the line at 0 and 3. The price declines uniformly from each of the endpoints until the center of the line which is the arbitrage point.
Pricing LPG in Mexico
The structure of imports, exports and production in Mexico is depicted in Figure 5 below. Mexico has some degree of monopoly power in Central and South America. 6 Further, this is a relatively small market, so the price of exports to South America is not a good guide for pricing gas in Mexico. Thus, exports to South America will be initially ignored as they only complicated the analysis. The implications of export to Central and South America on the price of LPG will be discussed in the next section.
6. Mexico ships LPG to Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Ecuador, as well as to other Latin American countries.
The essential features of this structure can be characterized by a model with two modes of import, one mode of export, one point of production and demand distributed geographically. The essential features of the distribution system for LPG are represented by the network depicted in Figure 6 below.
Figure 6
In this network, LPG is produced at point A. This production is denoted by Q. This gas can be transported to points on a line between A and B. Gas can be imported at points A and B, these imports are denoted by y 1 and y 2 respectively. The price of these imports is p 1 and p 2 .Gas can be exported at point A, these exports are denoted by z. The price of z is q. We can think of A as Pajaritos, the line A-B as demand in Mexico. We will make an assumption similar to Hotellings and assume that the distribution of demand on the line
A-B is given by a distribution function g(s)
. 7 The distribution function g(s) is general and could have mass points.Total demand on the line A-B is then given by 7. The problem is originally formulated by PEMEX as minimizing to cost of providing LPG subjected to a demand constraint. For this reason the demand for LPG, as represented by the density function, does not included price. This assumption can be support on two grounds. The solution is determined by the linear Kuhn-tucker conditions given by (6) and (7). Thus the solution is not sensitive to price unless there is a sufficient change in demand so that Mexico switches from importing to exporting LPG. Second, outside of petrochemicals, there are no close substitutes for LPG in Mexico. There have been no studies of the elasticities for LPG in Mexico, but econometric evidence suggests that the short run price elasticity for energy is small. See Dahl (1992) . Petrochemicals are outside the regulatory control of the CRE.
It is assumed that the cost of moving LPG from point A to a point located at n is c 2 n and the cost of moving LPG from point B to a point located at n is c 2 (1-n). The point s is what is referred to as the arbitrage point, the point where the price of LPG from point A or point B is equal.
The objective function of our model is (2) the constraints are:
.
where equation (3) is the resource constraint at point A and equation (4) is the resource constraint at point B. Equation (4) can be substituted into the objective function and the resulting Lagrangian is (5) where λ is the dual associated with the value of LPG. The first order conditions are
The first order condition with respect to s, under the assumption that , can be written as
. (8) If we examine inequalities (6), (7) and (8) 
If, on the other hand, there are no imports or exports, then s is determined by the solution of (3) for the condition that and equal to zero,
8. The import price at Pajaritos is either the price of LPG into the Gulf or the price of importing from Mont Belvieu.
(10)
The value of s then gives the price of LPG at Pajaritos through equation (8). This analysis leads to the rules that have been adopted. If LPG is imported or exported at Pajaritos, the the base price of LPG is that cost. If, on the other hand, there are no imports or exports at Pajaritos, the base price of LPG at Pajaritos is given by the rule (11) This is the "netback" rule that the CRE has implemented for pricing LPG in Mexico.
Problems with the structure of incentives
The CRE has the authority to regulate the price of LPG that is offered for sale in (12) where Z is the amount of LPG supplied to the petrochemical industry and/or exported. The base price of LPG at the point of production is then given by (11). If the arbitrage point is moved closer to the point of production, the price goes up by twice to cost of moving the gas. (See equation (11).) This price increase is then imputed on the entire stock of LPG
produce for domestic consumption. Thus, there are incentives to increase the price of the domestic stock of LPG by exporting production or diverting production to petrochemicals.
In fact, PEMEX would have incentives to sell in the unregulated market beyond the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
Let
be the net price PEMEX receives for sales to non regulated markets and β be the net price it receives in the regulated markets as determined by (11). Then the Lagrangian associated with maximizing revenues subject to a production constraint is, .
where is the shadow price of LPG to PEMEX in the revenue maximization problem. The first order conditions are:
Solving for we get,
Since the term , it follows that . Since the term is marginal revenue from nonregulated sales, there is an incentive for PEMEX to
sell nonregulated LPG beyond the point where marginal revenue is equal to the base price of LPG, β. Since the base price of LPG reflects the social shadow price of LPG, revenue maximizing on the part of PEMEX could lead to inefficiency.
Conclusions
This paper studies the implications of linking the Mexican market for LPG to international markets in an efficient manner. The results are consistent with the pricing formula that the Comisión Reguladora de Energía (Energy Regulatory Commission) has established for the pricing of LPG in Mexico. 9
1. If LPG is imported at Pajaritos, the base price of LPG is the import price.
2. If LPG is exported from Pajaritos, the base price of LPG is the export price. The first constraint requires that all demands be satisfied:
The second constraint requires that domestic production be consumed or exported:
(A-3)
The third constraint requires that imports be consumed or exported:
. (A-4) To show that the model can be simplified, define 
